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Abstract: 
Several theorists have argued that social policy in East Asia can be seen as representing a 
distinctive welfare ideal type based around ‘productive welfare’. However, we have 
contested such claims in earlier work (Hudson and Kühner, 2009) and, in common with 
theorists such as Castells, have suggested that some of the OECD welfare states have a 
distinct bias towards the ‘productive’ rather than ‘protective’ dimensions of welfare. In 
this paper, we build on our earlier work, utilising fuzzy set ideal type analysis (FSITA) to 
explore the balance between ‘productive’ and protective’ dimensions of welfare state 
activity.  Here  we  extend  our  analysis  beyond  the  OECD,  incorporating  a  range  of  
nations on the ‘fringe’ of the OECD from Latin America, East Asia and the non-OECD 
parts of Europe.  In so doing, we contest simple notions of welfare regimes aligning with 
regional blocks. Primarily, however, we highlight the advantages of the ‘diversity 
orientated’ approach to data analysis that fuzzy set methods facilitate in comparison with 
standard quantitative techniques. In particular, we utilize FSITA to avoid data availability 
and reliability issues that have plagued quantitatively informed classifications of global 
welfare regimes. Not least, we argue FSITA allows for the contextualisation of cases in a 
way that is sealed to quantitatively driven, comparative research. Thus, we argue FSITA 
has an important role to play in attempts to extend the inclusiveness of the ‘welfare 
modelling business’ in a manner that reflects diverse and highly significant cases beyond 
the Western lens that dominates the literature.      
 
                                                        1 Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of York, UK; E-mail john.hudson@york.ac.uk and 
stefan.kuehner@york.ac.uk for correspondence.  
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1. The Challenges of Classifying Welfare States 
The welfare state modelling literature has been fundamentally shaped by Esping-
Andersen (1990). Via extensive analysis of data and, especially, through the development 
of  an  innovative  decommodification  index  he  identified  a  trichotomy  of  ideal  types:  a  
comprehensive, state led, strongly protective social democratic regime; a safety-net based 
weakly protective liberal democratic regime; a social insurance based 
corporatist/conservative regime. Subsequent debate (see Abrahamson, 1999; Arts and 
Gelissen, 2002; Powell and Barrientos, 2011) has focused intensively on whether Esping-
Andersen correctly allocated nations to his three ideal types and, indeed, on whether 
there are more than three regimes. But, while early critiques of Esping-Andersen’s thesis 
tended to be grounded in theoretical concerns or observations about particular cases, 
social divisions or specific policy areas (e.g. Bonoli, 1997; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; 
Ferrara, 1996; Goodin et al., 1999; Jones, 1993, Kwon, 1997; Lewis, 1992), more recent 
critiques have brought methodological issues to the fore as well. Scruggs and Allen 
(2006) have provided arguably the most direct critique of Esping-Andersen’s methods to 
date as they suggest that his use of standard deviations from the mean to calculate his 
decommodification index can create “unjustified discontinuities in scoring” (Scruggs and 
Allan,  2006:  58).  Instead,  they  favour  standardized  Z-scores  that  show  how  far  an  
original  score  deviates  from  the  respective  mean  on  a  continuous  scale  for  the  
computation of ‘overall welfare generosity scores. Similarly, Room (2000) deploys Z-
scores in developing a prototype ‘human investment regimes’ index that captures the 
productive intent of welfare. While useful for ranking nations, index measures can prove 
more problematic in terms of classifying them into different types. A more sophisticated 
alternative comes through cluster analysis. Powell and Barrientos (2004) utilize this 
technique to allocate nations to welfare types on the basis of data similar to Esping-
Andersen’s but with new components such as the welfare mix and active labour market 
policy  (ALMP)  spending  added  in  for  good measure.  Cluster  analysis  is  a  powerful  for  
welfare  regime  analysis  because  it  groups  countries  in  such  a  way  that  the  degree  of  
statistical association between two nations is maximal if they belong to the same group 
and minimal otherwise. In yet a different, but related approach, Shalev (2007: 291) 
utilizes factor analysis, a data reduction procedure, which he dubs the ‘cousin’ of cluster 
analysis, for his exploration of welfare types.  
What  all  of  the  above  techniques  have  in  common is  that  they  rely  on  mean  averages,  
standard deviations and a linear understanding of relationships between variables that 
can mask important elements of cross-national diversity. In particular, they are prone to 
outlier  effects:  if  a  country  is  exceptionally  strong  or  weak  in  one  dimension  this  can  
have an undesirable impact on its classification; this is a particular problem for the 
calculation of additive indices, but the problem hampers cluster and factor analysis too. 
Moreover, while useful for identifying statistical patterns in the data, the approaches find 
it difficult to identify or pay due regard to, important conceptual issues signified by the 
data. This can result in countries being allocated to ideal types in ways that fail to capture 
the true meaning of underlying data (Hudson and Kühner, 2008, 2010).  
Fuzzy-set ideal type analysis (FSITA) can overcome these issues. Firstly, it does not allow 
for compensation effects to mask the real extent of diversity. If a welfare state is ‘weak’ 
in one area, it cannot ‘make up’ for this by being ‘very strong’ in another area. Secondly, 
the approach allows for the simultaneous analysis and measurement of multiple 
dimensions and handles these dimensions in a manner that emphasises, rather than 
ameliorates, difference: fuzzy logic allows us to classify nations on the basis of multiple, 
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even conflicting, components.  Finally, by forcing us to think about the links between 
data and concepts, FSITA offers a bridge between quantitative and qualitative 
approaches. In particular, by recognising that not all variation matters, FSITA avoids the 
distorting effects of extreme values that can thwart some quantitative analyses. These 
advantages have been well established in the growing fuzzy-set literature (see: e.g. Kvist 
2007).  
The aim of this paper is to show that the diversity-oriented approach offered by FSITA 
has a further strength particularly for attempts to broaden the sample of countries 
included in typologies beyond the OECD. Since Esping-Andersen’s original work was 
published there have been lively discussions highlighting characteristics of welfare 
policies in East Asia (see Holliday, 2000, Holliday, 2005; Holliday & Wilding, 2003; 
Kwon 1997, Kwon & Holliday, 2007), Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America 
and considerable debate about how they might relate to the ‘three worlds of welfare’ 
thesis. One can distinguish two broad approaches in this emerging ‘global welfare 
regimes debate’: one literature that focuses on single regions exclusively and mainly tries 
to draw out regional differences in welfare types (Central and Eastern Europe: Fenger 
2007, Bohle and Greskovits 2007; Latin America: Martinez Franzoni 2008, Filgueria 
1998); and, in contrast, more general approaches that include countries across all 
continents, and that often end up emphasizing similarities within regions over cross-
continental variation (Abu Shark and Gough 2010, Rudra 2007, Gough and Wood 2004, 
Wood and Gough 2006, Barrientos 2009).  
How, then, can FSITA offer advantages in the global welfare regimes debate? Our 
answer to this question will begin by briefly outlining the substantive premise of FSITA 
and methodological challenge it addresses (Section 2). Subsequently, we show what we 
believe are the core advantages it has offered us in our attempts to classify welfare 
regimes in high-income countries based on their protective and productive intent 
(Section 3). This will lead us back to a methodological debate about how, more generally, 
FSITA can help us move beyond common data availability and outlier issues that have 
hampered the relatively young ‘global welfare modelling business’. In particular, we will 
demonstrate that FSITA allows comparative social policy analysts to utilise their 
substantive knowledge not just of concepts and cases but also of data sources (Section 4). 
Thus, we present a classification of welfare states in 55 high and higher-middle income 
countries across all continents by utilizing different measures and fuzzy-set calibrations 
based on different country contexts (Section 5). We round off the paper by discussing 
the findings our method produces before offering an assessment of the strengths and 
limitations of the approach (Section 6). 
 
2. Beyond the OECD: Utilising FSITA 
FSITA has its origins in fuzzy set social science (Ragin, 2000). Its starting point is that 
cases  are  best  understood  as  distinct  and  differing  configurations  of  multiple,  
conceptually rooted, dimensions. Given this, the first practical step for those undertaking 
FSITA is to specify the key conceptual dimensions that are the focus of analysis and then 
proceed by viewing each of these dimensions as a ‘set’ in which the cases can have 
varying degrees of membership. Sets are ‘fuzzy’ because in the real world ‘crisp’ 
boundaries are rare occurrences: FSITA reflects this by analysing cases on the basis of 
their graded, partial memberships of sets.  
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The operationalisation of FSITA proceeds by assigning each case a score between 0 (full 
non-membership) and 1 (full membership) for each set being examined. Rather than 
simply rescaling raw data via arithmetic computation, it allows researchers to reconsider 
their quantitative and qualitative data from a conceptual viewpoint (Ragin 2007). FSITA 
thus differs from traditional quantitative approaches as it requires researchers to calibrate 
individual variables on the basis of ‘external, dependably known standards’ and is not 
content with using ‘very crude but passive’ mean averages and standard deviations which 
depend highly on characteristics of individual samples (Ragin 2008: 77). In short, FSITA 
demands that researchers consider how raw data relates to verbal descriptors of their 
concepts and to specify qualitative breakpoints at the top (fully in) and bottom (fully out) 
of their sets (see Kvist, 1999, 2006 and 2007). Ragin (2000) outlines numerous 
techniques for specifying the values between these two breakpoints. For FSITA the 
scores  for  each  fuzzy  set  are  essential.  What  is  equally  important  is  how  multiple 
dimensions are combined. Two key principles of logic are utilised to analyse 
combinations of sets: logical NOT (the negation principle) and logical AND (the 
intersection or minimum principle). Together, these two principles can be used to 
calculate all possible combinations of the multiple fuzzy sets being analysed.  
In contrast, more systematic studies contributing to the global welfare regimes debate 
have relied heavily on cluster analysis (see Table  1), a method that has considerable 
weaknesses in its power to allocate welfare systems to ideal types, particularly when 
conceptually distinct components are being analysed as part of the welfare mix (Hudson 
and Kühner 2010). More than this, it also cannot be used in a fashion that combines 
quantitative and qualitative data. It is, therefore, reliant on the use of (rare) data sources 
that cover a wide sample of nations. Other studies, have relied heavily on case studies of 
a small number of nations so have lacked any systematic comparison of the author’s 
chosen region with other regions of the world – this has been a particular issues for some 
discussions of East Asian welfare regimes but has hampered analyses of other regions 
too (see e.g. Holliday 2000, Aspalter 2006, Barrientos 2009). In both camps, 
methodological weaknesses have limited the scope and depth of the work: in the former 
a need to have simple and widely available variables that cover each case restrict the 
depth and quality of data, while for the latter detailed case study knowledge of a limited 
number of nations restricts the breadth of the study.  
***Table 1 somewhere here*** 
FSITA can overcome these limitations precisely because it allows substantive knowledge 
to be used in a broad way when constructing sets. Potentially this enables comparative 
social policy analysts to exploit the advantages of quantitative indicators – the breadth of 
coverage that comes from summary measures – with the advantages of case knowledge – 
additional context that may be needed to interpret simple indicators. However, to date 
much of the comparative social policy work utilising fuzzy set methods has proceeded on 
a cautious basis whereby sets are constructed on the basis of single quantitative 
indicators but with substantive knowledge used to inform cut off points (see e.g. Ragin 
2000, Pennings 2005, Kvist 2007; more generally see also Vis 2008, Vis 2009). This is an 
approach to FSITA that follows quantitative analysis norms as closely as possible. It also 
shares some of the limitations, therefore, of standard quantitative methods, not least that 
a  commonly  available  indicator  that  covers  each  case  in  the  sample  is  needed  for  each  
set.  
However, the social policy researcher’s substantive knowledge about cases – and, indeed, 
about statistical indicators – often tells us that a good measure for a set in one case may 
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not  be  a  good  measure  for  the  same  set  in  another  case.  This  is  particularly  so  when  
samples  are  made  up  of  a  large  range  of  countries  in  which  key  contexts  vary  widely.  
Standard quantitative methods offer us no clear route for combining these kinds of 
alternative measures into a single study, instead pushing analysts to examine different 
groups in separate studies. With FSITA, however, this is possible, though we will not 
pretend that this is easy, straightforward, or even uncontroversial. Indeed, such an 
approach perhaps pushes the credibility of the method to its limits. In particular, albeit 
comparatively less severe than in pure macro quantitative approaches, a trade-off remains 
between  the  ambition  to  include  in  the  analysis  an  increased  number  of  cases  and  the  
ability to weight the significance of historical case study evidence and numerical indices 
equally when calibrating sets. Researchers will continue to rely on information made 
available  by  international  organisations  such  as  the  OECD,  IMF  and  World  Bank.  
Conceptual and methodological issues have been discussed for some of these sources in 
more detail than for others (see e.g. DeDeken and Kittel 2007). Indeed, researchers that 
have experienced shaking heads and other expressions of disbelief by colleagues 
particularly in middle income countries in regards to how their country is represented in 
these common international databases may wonder how much these can really teach us 
beyond the highest income countries. While we argue that FSITA is a powerful tool in 
alleviating such data availability and reliability issues; it cannot and not should be seen as 
a panacea. There will always be a certain cost attached to assuming a moderate-N, ‘bird’s 
eye’ perspective of analysis. 
 
3. Productive and Protective Welfare Types Revisited 
The potential of FSITA in practice is best illustrated by means of an example. Here we 
draw on our recent classification of welfare states on the basis of their protective and 
productive dimensions (see Hudson and Kühner, 2009). We have already noted most 
attempts to classify welfare states into ideal types follow Esping-Andersen’s lead by 
emphasising the protective intent of social security programmes. More recently, however, 
this focus on social rights has been challenged. Indeed, Evans and Cerny (2003; Cerny 
and  Evans,  1999)  suggest  the  welfare  state  has  been  replaced  by  a  ‘competition  state’,  
with traditional income protections being gradually dismantled in favour of social 
investment policies such as education and training that can boost economic 
competitiveness. Jessop (2000) similarly argues that we have seen the death of the old 
style ‘Keynesian Welfare National State’ and the rise of the ‘Schumpeterian Workfare 
Post-National Regime’ in which the state constrains social rights in the face of an 
increasingly competitive global economy. Giddens has forcefully argued that the 
emergence of globalised knowledge based economy requires greater emphasis on the 
human investment functions of welfare (Giddens 2006). Meanwhile, Castells and 
Himmanen (2002) have argued that some welfare states have adapted their structures in 
light of the emerging informational society. They point to different models found in the 
two leading ‘informational societies’: a largely free-market approach with social 
protections  kept  to  a  minimum  in  the  USA,  which  contrasts  with  the  approach  in  
Finland which has adapted its strongly interventionist social policy frameworks in a 
manner that both maintains strong social protection and encourages the modernisation 
of its economy. All these perspectives place or add an emphasis on the ‘productive’ 
dimensions of welfare that invest in human capital. 
 
One of the thorniest questions within both welfare regime analysis and this wider 
discourse on ‘productive welfare’ has been how best to classify East Asian states. Indeed, 
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an  early  criticism  of  Esping-Andersen’s  work  was  that  it  had  misunderstood  -  and  
therefore misclassified – Japan, the only East Asian nation included in his typology 
(Esping-Andersen, 1997). While, as Esping-Andersen (1999) acknowledges, all 
classifications rely on simplified ideal types that cannot fully capture the complex reality 
of actual welfare regimes, several theorists – most notably Holliday (Holliday, 2000; 
Holliday, 2005; Holliday & Wilding, 2003; Kwon & Holliday, 2007) - have argued that 
social policy regimes in East Asia can be seen as distinct from the three welfare regimes 
types articulated by Esping-Andersen because of their productive – rather than protective - 
intent. This is a bold claim that presents a direct challenge to dominant approaches in the 
welfare modelling business2. 
In order to address these above debates, we (Hudson and Kühner, 2009) used FSITA to 
classify  welfare  states  on  the  basis  of  four  key  components:  two  reflecting  the  key  
protective dimensions found in employment and income protection programmes; and 
two reflecting productive dimensions found in education and active labour market 
programmes (ALMPs). Table 2 summarises the variables, data sources and cut-off points 
we used. 
***Table 2 somewhere here*** 
These four conceptually rooted dimensions were translated into four fuzzy sets that 
logically combine to sixteen types. Four of these are ‘pure’ ideal types. Countries which 
score high on each of the four fuzzy sets – education investment, training investment, 
income protection and employment protection – combine both productive and 
protective elements successfully and constitute the productive-protective ideal type. Countries 
that score high on both productive sets (education and training investment), but do not 
make it into the protective sets are purely productive ideal types. Equally, purely protective ideal 
types score high on income and employment protection but perform less well in 
education and training investment. Weak ideal types score low on both protective and 
productive fuzzy sets. The remaining types are hybrids; these are also relevant. Weak 
productive-protective types each score high only on one of the respective productive and 
protective  fuzzy  set  variables  –  i.e.  these  cases  show  high  education  investment  paired  
with either high income or high employment protection or high training investment with 
either high income or employment protection. Those countries that score high on both 
productive sets and also on one of the two protective fuzzy sets are labelled productive-plus 
types. If a country only scores high on one of the productive and none of the protective 
countries, they were labelled weak productive. Equally, those countries with high scores on 
both protective and one additional productive fuzzy set are labelled protective-plus types. 
Weak protective types score high on only one of the two protective fuzzy set variables.     
Our  findings  for  2003  (see  Hudson and  Kühner  2009)  suggest  that  Finland  was  at  the  
cross-over point for the productive-protective ideal type, which is interesting since it 
matched Castells and Himanens’ (2002) thesis of the Finnish model being closest to what 
they call an ‘informational welfare state’. Further support for their thesis comes from the 
USA  –  which  they  regard  as  an  unbalanced  informational  welfare  state  -  being  placed  
strongly within the pure productive set, where it is joined by New Zealand. Both Belgium 
and Germany were members of the pure protective set, reflecting the corporatist                                                         
2 Some authors have used the notion of ‘productive’ welfare to denote government policies aimed at 
extending formal labour markets (see e.g. Rudra 2007, Barrientos 2009). ‘Productive’ welfare policies in 
this sense, i.e. policies promoting labour commodification, are only loosely related to the use of the term in 
this paper.  
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orientation of their welfare arrangements. Meanwhile Australia, along with the UK 
(which is at the cross-over point), were placed within the weak set according to the data, 
hinting that these two nations steer a mid-course between the American and European 
traditions – offering a cut down version of each model – rather than sharing the same 
features as the USA as suggested by most typologies. All four Scandinavian countries 
were – at least – very close to combining productive and protective elements similar to 
Finland. This is an important finding, for it is at odds with Holliday’s (2000) argument 
that protective and productive features are mutually exclusive and the basis of different 
welfare state types. Contrary to Holliday’s (2000) suggestion that a focus on productive 
welfare forms the basis of an East Asian model, neither of the two included East-Asian 
countries actually qualifies as a purely productive ideal-type. 
 
4. Beyond the OECD? 
Although there is more to be said about the classifications identified above, we believe 
that, fuzzy set ideal type analysis produced a robust set of groupings that stand up well to 
more detailed case based scrutiny (see Hudson and Kühner, 2009 for a fuller discussion). 
A further strength of the approach lies in how the method combines indicators for 
different dimensions (Hudson and Kühner, 2010): the ‘dependent variable problem’ is no 
longer only a problem of conceptualisation and indicator operationalisation for as 
analysts have increasingly acknowledged the multidimensional character of welfare states, 
it has also become an issue of choosing the most appropriate methodological technique 
to determine country membership of theoretically-informed ideal-types. Statistical 
methods rooted in averaging processes (e.g. indices, cluster analysis, factor analysis) work 
well  when  dealing  with  a  single  component  of  welfare,  but  they  struggle  to  cope  with  
more complex pictures of welfare that highlight multiple, conceptually distinct and 
‘antithetical’,  components  of  welfare.  Fuzzy  set  ideal  type  analysis,  meanwhile,  excels  in  
offering just such an analysis because distinct and conceptually rooted sets are its starting 
point. Weakness in one area cannot be compensated for by strength in another with 
fuzzy set approaches. 
However, our operationalisation of the fuzzy set ideal type analysis was cautious in our 
initial study (Hudson and Kühner, 2009), following quantitative norms to a large degree. 
In particular, we drew our set memberships entirely on the basis of OECD statistical 
information – albeit using substantive knowledge to help inform cut-off points for each 
set. A more radical approach would depart from these quantitative norms, using 
qualitative data to supplement or even replace quantitative data in determining set 
memberships. We believe that this ability to utilise data of different types – and, 
consequently, from different sources – is another strength that fuzzy set ideal type 
analysis can bring to the welfare modelling business and, crucially, one that can help us 
undertake analysis beyond the OECD nations. There are a number of reasons for wishing 
to extend the analysis of welfare models beyond the high-income countries but the 
barriers to so doing are not insubstantial. Chief amongst them is a significant practical 
hurdle: detailed and comparable quantitative data on welfare state activity is hard to come 
by for non-OECD nations. Whilst a growing number of international organisations now 
publish data relating to non-OECD nations (e.g. UNDP, WB, IMF, ILO), this data is 
much less detailed, patchier in terms of the availability of indicators and often restricted 
to  very  general  measures.  On top  of  this,  the  dependent  variable  problem is  magnified  
when countries operating in very different contexts are compared, a problem illustrated 
well by the UNDP Human Development Index which provides a reasonable comparison 
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of nations in broad terms but is too crude an instrument to provide fine-grained 
judgements  on  the  differences  of  well-being  between  the  richest  nations  of  the  world.  
We believe that fuzzy set ideal type analysis is strongly placed to address these challenges 
and proceed now to offer such an analysis.  
 
5. Beyond the OECD: Calibration of Sets 
We initially looked at a total of 81 nations classified by the World Bank as upper-middle 
and high-income and with a total population over 500,000. However, data availability 
restricted our data sample even within these parameters: 21 of these 81 countries did not 
report or only insufficiently report to the International Monetary Fund’s Government Financial 
Statistics database, our source for education, health and social security spending figures3. 
Another five countries were not covered in the ILO data (2010) or did not provide 
information needed for our analysis. This left us with a total of 55 countries with a 
complete set of data, adding to the 30 OECD nations a further 25 countries that are on 
the cusp of the OECD’s level of wealth but excluding very small island states.  
Within this sample there is still a significant variation in the context in which social policy 
operates and for the purposes of our argument we have drawn a broad distinction 
between those nations that the ILO (2010) classify as having highly commodified 
labour markets and those with less commodifed labour markets – the latter being 
those with more than 20 per cent of workers in non-wage (i.e. informal) employment.  
This distinction becomes important methodologically:  as a first, admittedly crude, step 
some nations will be treated to different membership tests for a set on this basis and we 
organize our findings with reference to the levels of commodification too.4 
***Table 3 somewhere here*** 
In calibrating our sets the starting point was, where possible, to use the same data 
sources and cut off points that we utilised in our original study of OECD nations. 
However, as we had to draw on different data sources and less fine grained measures for 
the non-OECD nations, a process for ‘matching’ the new cases with our OECD cases 
needed  to  be  developed.  Whilst  we  could  have  used  the  less  fine  grained  measures  for  
OECD cases too, dropping nuanced measures for less nuanced measures for those cases 
seemed counterintuitive.  Instead, we decided to align the non-OECD data with the 
OECD data by: (i) cross-referencing OECD cases appearing in both samples to 
determine  where  set  boundaries  might  fall  in  the  two  data  sources;  (ii)  simplifying  the  
fuzzy  set  scores  for  our  sets,  using  a  six-point  scale  rather  than  a  continuous  scale  to  
reflect the less fine grained nature of our scores; and, (iii) using the OECD data to 
determine scores for OECD cases whilst using the alternative data sources for our other 
cases. This process – which we explain in more detail for each set below - allowed us to 
determine meaningful membership of each of our four sets with somewhat patchy data 
and, using the scores for these sets, plot membership of the cases into our original 
productive-protective ideal types. 
                                                        
3 In Hudson and Kühner (2009) we utilized OECD data to compute the education investment indicator. 
Full details of the data sources used for each set in this paper can be found in the Appendix, table A2.  
4 As was highlighted by a referee of the Compasss working paper series, this makes a crisp distinction 
between countries above and below the 20 per cent mark and essentially exaggerates the difference 
between a country A with say a non-wage working population of 19 per cent and a country B with 21 per 
cent. One could certainly think of more sophisticated ways to take country contexts into account. This 
rather crude example is merely meant to illustrate the methodological point we are trying to make here.  
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For our employment protection set, we supplemented the data from the OECD Employment 
Protection Legislation index used in our original study with data from the World Bank 
Rigidity of Employment Index (REI). The latter relates to 2008 and was published in 
2010; we also took the opportunity of updating the EPL data for our OECD nations. 
Though ostensibly measuring the same activity, i.e. the strength of employment 
protection, the specifics of the EPL and REI vary considerably in practice. This required 
us to cross-reference the two data sources using key cases found in both data sets and via 
visual examinations of scatterplots of the indicators for these common cases (i.e. nations 
in both data sets). The key reference cases for transformation of the REI data to a six-
point fuzzy set calibrated with our EPL based set were as follows: 
 
x 1 (Fully in): Just above Spain  
x 0.8 (Mostly but not fully in): Just below Norway  
x 0.6 (More or less in): Just below Korea  
x 0.4 (More or less out): just above Denmark 
x 0.2 (Mostly but not fully out): just above Canada  
x 0 (Fully out): at or below the USA  
 
Table 4 summarises the calibrated cut off points for the REI data. Given the simplified 
six-point fuzzy set used for this data rather than the continuous scale variable used in our 
initial study – a reflection of the less precise approach to constructing the set – we also 
recoded the EPL based continuous variable into a six point set and Table 4 outlines the 
protocol for this too. 
***Table 4 somewhere here*** 
Following this initial calibration, we cross-referenced the generated set scores with case 
study knowledge in order to assess their veracity. A key question for us here – especially 
crucial  given  the  different  data  sources  –  was  whether  the  set  memberships  are  
constructed in a fashion that respects the differences between the countries with high 
and  low  levels  of  labour  market  commodification.   Our  conclusion  was  some  caution  
needs to be injected into interpreting this set: the level of informal employment in some 
cases creates a very different context for employment regulation policies. The REI 
captures data from the largest city(ies) in each nation and only looks at the rules for 
SMEs - this automatically places the focus on the rules for those in formal employment 
in  urban  areas.  Obviously  this  needs  to  be  borne  in  mind  when interpreting  ideal  type  
memberships for the set does not capture the level of protection for the whole nation. 
Nonetheless, our view is that the differing data sources automatically build in a fair 
relaxation of the test for joining the employment protection set for nations with low 
levels of labour market commodification: if, as for the OECD nations, data covered the 
whole nation, this would automatically exclude virtually all of the non-OECD nations 
from the set. Indeed, we are examining the balance of welfare between productive and 
protective welfare rather than the efficacy of welfare in each nation. 
For the education investment set we used the percentage of total welfare spending accounted 
for by education. We also utilised the same cut-off points for our sets (25% fully in; 15% 
fully out). The measure was calculated using World Bank data for the 2004-6 period. 
Though slight variations exist between the accounting practices of the OECD and World 
Bank, these are not of an order to require cross-referencing between common cases in 
order to calibrate the different data sources.  While there could be a problem in utilising 
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the same measures for all cases – the education share will tend to be higher in less 
mature, developmental welfare systems - ultimately, as mentioned above, this set is about 
policy makers' intent in terms of where they place the balance of their spending efforts. 
It is therefore still valid, although we stress that it tells us little about the effectiveness of 
policy, which is not the focus of our analysis here. The final stage in terms of 
constructing  this  set  was  to  convert  data  from a  continuous  scale  to  a  six  point  set  in  
order to simplify the analysis. Here we followed the approach used for transforming our 
EPL set. 
We faced considerable challenges with the income protection set.  The key issue here is that 
we used a very strict measure of protective intent in our original study, examining the 
income replacement rates of benefits provided to a long term unemployed single worker 
with  no  children  (Hudson  and  Kühner,  2009).  The  extensive  data  provided  by  the  
OECD on the tax and benefit systems of its members allows for very fine grained 
analysis of social supports of this kind. No comparable measure exists outside of the 
OECD. However, as with the employment protection set, it seems unlikely that such a 
measure would provide a fair test of protective intent for lower income nations and/or 
those with less mature welfare systems:  indeed, our substantive knowledge would lead us 
to conclude it is not.  
Following  the  approach  we  used  in  a  subsequent  study  (Hudson and  Kühner,  2011),  a  
second best measure - Botero et al's (2003) unemployment sub-index of their social 
security index – was considered. However, though arguably the most comprehensive 
index available, it is rather dated, examining the picture in 1997 for most countries in its 
sample.  Cross referencing data from Botero et al’s index with data from the OECD 
pointed to some significant inconsistencies and case knowledge of those inconsistencies 
lead us to conclude that the depth of reform in some nations since 1997 rendered usage 
of Botero et al’s data problematic.    
This left us with very limited options: in the absence of an authoritative data source that 
was up-to-date we could not simply utilise quantitative indicators. Equally the large 
number of cases in our sample of 51 nations precluded a very detailed case study analysis 
of each system. A compromise position involved consulting the US Social Security 
Administration's (2010) Social Security Systems Throughout the World, supplemented with 
coverage data from the ILO (2010). The SSA database carries detailed descriptions of the 
programme rules for a very large sample of social security systems across the globe and 
has informed other studies using fuzzy sets (see e.g. Vis 2009). Data was extracted from 
these accounts of key dimensions of each nation's system of support for the 
unemployed. Given that only mature welfare states tend to offer extensive support for 
the long term unemployed, here we focused on support for the unemployed in general, 
examining the coverage of unemployment protection schemes, the length and size of 
contributions to a scheme required in order to qualify for unemployment benefits and 
the level of income replaced by benefits. Table 5 lists the programme features examined 
on this basis and how they were scored. Summaries of the programme data and scores 
for each case can be found in the statistical Appendix to this paper.  
***Table 5 somewhere here*** 
We collected OECD data on replacement rates for long term unemployed single average 
wage production works with no children for those nations where this is possible but 
updated  for  2008  (Netherlands  2007;  Cyprus  2007).  This  data  was  fuzzified  into  a  
continuous  scale  set  using  the  cut-off  points  of  20%  (fully  out)  and  70%  (fully  in),  as  
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with our initial  study,  but then transformed into a six-point scale as with the other sets 
described above. The latest version of the OECD’s Benefits and Wages included data for 
some non-OECD cases; in such instances, determining which measure of set 
membership  to  use  (i.e.  OECD  or  SSA)  was  informed  by  ILO  data  on  the  degree  of  
labour market commodification, with the SSA data used to allocate set scores for those 
with less commodified labour markets.  
Finally, for the training investment set  we  again  utilised  updated  data  for  the  OECD  
nations,  drawing  on  the  latest  statistics  for  2005-7  from  OECD  and  similar  data  from  
EUROSTAT for non-OECD EU members. However, a reclassification of this data into 
new headings meant we could not follow the approach used in our initial study fully: 
spending under the headings of ‘Training’ and ‘Supported employment and 
rehabilitation’  were  included  as  productive;  other  elements  (Labour  market  services;  
Training; Job rotation and job sharing; Employment incentives; Direct job creation; 
Start-up incentives) as non-productive. We used the same anchors as in our original 
study, calculating ‘productive’ ALMP spending as a share of total ALMP spending and 
with 20% being fully out of the set and 80% fully in. 
For other nations, however, the challenge of assigning set membership was very difficult 
indeed.  The  data  provided  by  the  OECD  is  very  fine  grained  and  allows  us  to  
disaggregate total ALMP spending into different components. The ability to disaggregate 
in specific components is instrumental since we are interested not in the total amount 
spend on ALMPs, but in comparing the weight of spending within the ALMP budget. 
Eurostat data allows us to expand the scope of analysis beyond OECD countries by 
offering this kind of data for a number of Central and Eastern European countries. 
However,  data  availability  beyond  these  two  groups  of  countries  is  limited.  The  ADB  
(2008b) includes data on labour market spending, but does not break these down into 
single components. Labour market training spending is not provided for most of the 
countries in East Asia. Other databases, such as the ILO Key Indicators of Labour 
Markets (KILM), and large-scale assessment studies of ALMPs in developing and 
transitional countries (see Lehman and Kluve 2008, Betcherman et al. 2004) do not 
provide systematic ALMP spending data that goes beyond those offered by the 
OECD/Eurostat. Clearly this lack of data is problematic for our analysis and, in order to 
address  the  questions  of  global  welfare  regimes  by  way  of  including  a  wider  sample  of  
countries, we only have the choice between the two strategies proposed in Hudson and 
Kühner (2011). We accept that these strategies may be seen as contentious by some 
readers and therefore would argue that our findings should only be seen as tentative at 
this point.  
The first, and in a way preferable, option is to use qualitative knowledge of the cases to 
allocate scores for each nation with missing ALMP statistics. But this approach is by no 
means an easy way out. Our ambition is to add these nations to our original 
classification. Therefore, scores assigned on the basis of our qualitative knowledge must 
be meaningful when compared to scores in our original study of 23 nations. Also, as the 
number of cases increases in our sample, it gets more and more challenging to 
accumulate the qualitative knowledge necessary to assign set membership in a confident 
manner.  Our  review of  available  data  and  cross-national  studies  of  ALMPs (e.g.  ADB,  
2008; Benson & Zhu, 2005; Betcherman et al, 2001; ILO, 2001, 2005, 2008) suggested 
that Korea is likely to have the most extensive set of ALMPs in our sample of seven East 
Asian regimes and, possibly, Japan to have the second most extensive. We thus 
concluded that if this broad view of little tradition of training based ALMPs in the 
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region, with Korea as the leader here, is correct, then we could score Korea as just out of 
the set and place the other East Asian cases alongside Japan as fully out of the set.  
***Table 6 somewhere here*** 
The picture is more complicated for non-OECD countries beyond East Asia. ALMPs 
have gained significance in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America 
recently  but  both  the  extent  and  focus  of  ALMPs  vary  (Betcherman  et  al.  2004).  
Consequently, it is extremely difficult to assign membership scores for the LMT set 
without further systematic statistical evidence or qualitative knowledge of the included 
Central European and Latin American cases. So, we are forced to present our analysis in 
two stages: first, using all four dimensions – including the crude interpretation of labour 
market training investment for the OECD and East Asian tigers; and second, omitting 
the LMT dimension from the analysis for the entire sample of countries. The latter is a 
very crude solution in particular, since it does not chime well with our theoretical 
identification of the four fuzzy sets. Either way, this simplified approach produces a 
property space based on just three dimensions; Table 6 outlines this model. 
 
6. Beyond the OECD: Findings. 
Using  the  above  methods,  our  findings  (see  Table  7)  using  the  updated  and  extended  
data are in line with our earlier challenge to Holiday (2000). It is again the United States 
and New Zealand, and not the East Asian countries that are placed most firmly in the 
purely productive type. Korea joins the productive-protective set – i.e. rather than 
subordinating protective to productive welfare functions, it manages to combine both to 
a significant extent. Japan now joins the group of ‘weak’ countries. China and Hong 
Kong  are  both  placed  in  the  weak  protective-productive  set  –  albeit  with  different  set  
membership. They are very different in terms of their employment protection legislation 
scores: while Hong Kong is fully out of this set, China is mostly but not fully in. At the 
same time, China is more or less out of the income protection set, mainly because 
relatively generous unemployment protection only reaches a very small proportion of the 
unemployed (ILO 2010). Finally, Malaysia and Singapore remain closest to the purely 
productive  ideal  type.  Indeed,  Singapore  is  the  only  country  next  to  the  United  States  
that is fully in the education investment set and fully out of both the income and 
employment protection legislation sets.  
***Table 7 somewhere here*** 
There are some important changes, for theoretical reasons, in the country memberships 
of  the  OECD nations  when using  the  updated  data.  These  findings  suggest  that  more  
detailed case studies may be warranted to understand these changes more fully – and 
indeed to test the robustness of the country classifications as well as the chosen data and 
cut-off  points across the four sets:  Finland was situated at  the cross-over point for the 
productive-protective ideal type for the 2003 data (Hudson and Kühner 2009). After 
losing its membership of the income protection and education investment set, it is now 
merely a member of the weak-productive-protective type - alongside a fairly diverse 
group of countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovenia, Romania and the afore-
mentioned China and Hong Kong. Similarly, while being very close to the productive-
protective  ideal  type  in  2003,  Sweden  was  more  or  less  out  of  both  the  income  
protection  and  education  investment  set  in  2008  too.  By  reducing  its  LMT  budget  by  
almost a third and by raising the money spent on employment incentives at the same 
 13 
time,  the  OECD data  suggests  that  Sweden  has  shifted  its  approach  to  ALMPs.  There  
are still a number of countries that manage to combine, or are very close to combining, 
both productive and protective forms of welfare, namely Denmark and Norway - joined 
this time by a group of more unlikely candidates Poland, Mexico and Turkey all of which, 
however, have been assigned membership scores on the basis of there relatively high 
informal markets. Austria kept its place in the protective-plus ideal type.  Meanwhile, the 
Netherlands, due to increases in the relative share of education spending, has moved 
right to the crossover of the productive-protective ideal-type. Belgium remains the only 
purely protective country as Germany joins the weak protective set after changes in 
unemployment protection really came into effect since 2005.  
***Table 8 somewhere here*** 
The three-dimension model confirms studies underlining regional variation of welfare 
systems; our preliminary findings would argue against classifications that are oriented 
along broad geographical units. Similar to above, these findings maybe helpful to 
suggesting ensuing case study analyses: The Russian Federation joins Latvia in the 
productive-protective ideal type; Kazakhstan joins the productive-protective (income 
set), while Lithuania, Poland and Romania are now all firmly in the productive-protective 
(EPL)  set.  Croatia  is  the  most  protective  country  in  our  sample  –  fully  in  the  
employment and almost fully in the income protection set while at the same time fully 
out of the education investment set. Bulgaria joins the weak ideal type. As for the Latin 
American nations, Venezuela is fully in the employment protection and education 
investment set, while the Dominican Republic joins the purely productive countries. 
Chile and Mexico scores similarly across the three dimensions and join the productive-
protective (EPL) ideal-type. Brazil features equally high employment protection 
legislation scores as Chile and Mexico, but fails to match the relative levels of education 
investment. Uruguay shows very different characteristics yet again: it also fails to join the 
education investment set, but is more or less in the income protection set. Employment 
protection is much weaker in Uruguay compared to Chile, Mexico and Brazil. Argentina 
and  Colombia  are  members  of  the  weak  ideal-type:  Argentina  is  fully  out  of  the  
education investment set and more or less out of the income and employment protection 
sets; Colombia is more or less out of the employment protection and education set. It is 
almost fully out of the income protection set.  
7. Conclusions: FSITA and Global Welfare Types 
What, then, has our attempt to utilise FSITA for an analysis of welfare in some 55 cases 
shown?  While we have not had the space here to analyse in great detail the implications 
of our classification for each particular case, we hope, in substantive terms, that at the 
very least we have underlined still further the view that welfare state types do not simply 
interface with regional blocs when it comes to the balance between productive and 
protective dimensions of welfare. We find diversity within Europe, within East Asia and 
within South America. Likewise there is no clear division between nations with highly or 
less highly commodified labour markets.  As for the productive welfarism argument, 
there is strong evidence that East Asia is not the exemplar of this approach. 
Nevertheless, as the main focus of this paper has been about the potential of FSITA 
methods, and indeed in the face of the preliminary character of these results, we will 
refrain from the temptation to further analyse our findings.  
Data quality and availability typically becomes more of an issue, the more one wants to 
capture cases outside of the high-income OECD. In the light of this, interesting cases are 
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still being excluded from analysis too often; studies are still too often forced to revert to 
what could be labelled 'lowest common denominator' indicators to ensure inclusion of a 
wide-as-possible country sample. By way of using our recent work on the productive and 
protective dimensions of welfare we have shown FSITA can overcome some of these 
issues by providing researchers with the opportunity to combine quantitative statistics 
and qualitative knowledge of cases systematically as basis for the assignment of 
membership scores. By doing so, we have demonstrated FSITA allows for careful 
contextualisation of cases and as such utilizing different types of quantitative evidence 
might not always be born out of necessity, but may be called for on theoretical grounds.  
As a consequence, FSITA has considerable advantages in allowing us to broaden the 
sample of countries analysed. For some time it has been clear that comparative social 
policy analysts have been constrained by data availability issues in their efforts to create 
typologies that go beyond the OECD. The restricting factor here – the choice between 
using the best possible data but constricting the analysis only to high income countries or 
using measures that are of lower quality in order to expand the sample of cases - can be 
transcended through the use of FSITA as we have shown here. We do not pretend that 
such an approach is straightforward or without problems of its own, but if we are serious 
about expanding the analysis of welfare state types beyond the OECD then it seems 
foolish to make the first step in such an approach the abandonment of the best datasets 
available to social policy analysts. Instead, calibrating data from multiple sources by 
cross-referencing common cases in these sources and, in so doing, referring back to 
substantive  knowledge  of  countries,  data  sources  and  concepts  offers  a  more  nuanced  
way forward. Crucially, such an approach allows us to assign membership scores to 
different countries in different ways. Whilst this may be contentious – and certainly 
transgresses the norms of quantitative research – it is worth stressing here that countries 
are concepts too5 and if the researcher’s substantive knowledge suggests clear differences 
in context mean that key concepts need to measured differently in some cases compared 
to others then why should this be disallowed?  
Finally the big picture issue is that the methodological advantages we outline here offer 
the potential for significant theoretical development in the welfare typology debate. This 
debate  itself  is  now at  a  mature  stage  and  two decades  after  Esping-Andersen’s  (1990)  
seminal book it seems odd that despite major changes in the world order much of the 
welfare modelling research still fails to encompass the far larger group of nations that can 
be presumed to be ‘welfare capitalist’ states than was case in the 1980s. Pragmatic and 
very human constraints relating to the availability of quantitative data on the one hand 
and limits to the number of cases individuals can have deeper qualitative knowledge 
about have been the constraining factors here. But this seems an increasingly feeble 
argument in the contemporary world. Peter Baldwin (1996: 29) is dismissive of the 
welfare modelling business, arguing that ‘Typologizing (...) is the lowest form of 
intellectual endeavour, parallel to the works of bean-counters and bookkeepers’. Perhaps 
this is so when purely quantitative approaches take us away from exploring the cases 
themselves. Because FSITA still allows us to be frugal in our data collection compared to 
the very detailed historical analyses of cases Baldwin favours, we can gain some of the 
contemporary relevance that the work of Baldwin or Esping-Andersen lacks. China has a 
dozen cities with populations that exceed that of Finland and the population of Brazil’s 
largest  city,  São  Paulo,  exceeds  that  of  20  EU  member  states.  If  there  is  a  purpose  to                                                          
5 More specifically, rather than being uniform in nature, there are qualitatively important differences in the 
ways different countries/nation states may be conceptualised and this can be a significant factor that a 
researcher may need to take into account when constructing their theories and/or designing frameworks 
for analysis.   
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typologising,  surely,  it  is  to  help  us  to  learn  more  about  key  cases  and  to  help  us  in  
developing robust theories about the pressures welfare systems face and how they 
respond to them. Finding appropriate methodological tools for allowing us to look 
beyond the OECD in our typologising seems essential if our typologies are to retain their 
theoretical purchase. 
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Table 1. Typologies of global welfare – an overview 
Study Types of welfare Dimensions Extraction method 
Fenger (2007) Eastern and Western Europe:  
(a) conservative-corporatist type;  
(b) social-democratic type;  
(c) liberal type;  
(d) former-USSR type;  
(e) post-communist European type;  
(f) developing welfare states type 
Characteristics of 
governmental 
programmes; Social 
situation; political 
participation 
Hierarchical cluster 
analysis; n=30; 19 
indicators used 
Martinez-Franzoni 
(2008) Latin America:  
(a) state-targeted type;  
(b) state-stratified type;  
(c) informal-familialist 
Commodification; 
decommodification; 
defamiliarization; 
performance 
Hierarchical cluster 
analysis; n=18; 19 
indicators used 
Wood and Gough 
(2006) Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa: 
(a) actual or potential welfare state regimes;  
(b) more effective informal security regimes;  
(c) less effective informal security regimes;  
(d) externally dependent insecurity regimes 
HDI; public 
spending; 
international flows 
of aid and 
remittances 
K-means cluster 
analysis; n=56; 3 
indicators used 
Rudra (2007) Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa: 
(a) productive; (b) dual; (c) protective  
Commodification; 
decommodification 
Hierarchical cluster 
analysis; n=32; 10 
indicators used 
Abu Sharkh and 
Gough (2010) Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa: 
(a) proto welfare state regimes;  
(b) successful informal security regimes;  
(c) failing informal security regimes;  
(d) failing informal security regimes;  
(e) insecurity regimes 
Governmental and 
public responsibility 
for social resources; 
state ‘throughputs’; 
official aid and 
remittances from 
overseas migrants 
Hierarchical and k-
means cluster analysis; 
n=65; 8 indicators used 
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Table 2. Productive – Protective Indicators (1994-2003) 
Dimension Indicator Fully In Fully 
Out 
Data Sources 
Education 
Investment 
Public education spending as 
a share of total public social 
and education spending 
25% 15% OECD Education at a 
Glance; OECD Social 
Expenditure Database 
Training 
Investment 
Training component of 
ALMP budgets as a share of 
the total ALMP budget 
80% 20% OECD Social Expenditure 
Database 
Income 
Protection 
Net replacement rate of 
benefits (including social 
assistance payments) for a 
single, long-term 
unemployed worker without 
any children at average 
production worker wage  
70% 20% OECD Tax and Benefit 
Models 
Employment 
Protection 
OECD Employment 
Protection Legislation Index 
(EPL) (version 1) 
3.0 0.5 OECD Employment 
Outlook 
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 Table 3. Country Sample 
Argentina Denmark Kazakhstan Serbia 
Australia Dominican Republic Korea Singapore 
Austria Estonia Latvia Slovak Republic 
Belarus Finland Lithuania Slovenia 
Belgium France Malaysia South Africa 
Brazil Germany Mexico Spain 
Bulgaria Greece Netherlands Sweden 
Canada Hong Kong, SAR New Zealand Switzerland 
Chile Hungary Norway Turkey 
China Ireland Panama United Kingdom 
Colombia Israel Poland United States 
Croatia Italy Portugal Uruguay 
Cyprus Jamaica Romania Venezuela 
Czech Republic Japan Russian Federation  
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Table 4. Set Membership Scores for Employment Protection Set 
Score in new set Score in REI Score in original EPL set 
1 (Fully in) 50 0.9 to 1 
.8 (Mostly but not fully in) 44 0.7 to < 0.9 
.6 (More or less in) 38 0.5 to <0.7 
.4 (More or less out) 8 0.3 to <0.5 
.2 (Mostly but not fully out) 6 0.1 to <0.3 
0 (Fully out) 0 0.00 to <0.1 
 23 
Table 5. Coding SSA Data into Income Protection Set 
Dimension Scoring6 
Coverage 7 0 points for coverage under 20% (or no benefit)  
.1 points for coverage between 20% to 40% 
.2 points for coverage over 40% 
 
Qualifying Period 
 
0 if more than 12 months or no benefit 
.1 points if > 6 and up to 12 months 
.2 points if up to 6 months 
.3 points if no qualify period 
 
Duration 
 
0 if less than 6 months or no benefit 
.1 points if 6 – <12 months or lump sum 
.2 points if 12 months or more. 
 
Benefit Level8 
 
0 points if no benefit  
.1 if means tested OR pegged to (or below) minimum wage or 
lump sum 
.3 if earnings related but up to 50% (- .1 if also means tested) 
.4 if earnings related but more than 50% (- .1 if also means 
tested) 
 
 
                                                        
6 In creating an index from SSA data the following scores guide us - they combine together to form a maximum 
that could exceed 1.0  - reflecting that there may be different routes to becoming a full member of the set – but 
1.0 is, obviously, the maximum possible score. The points listed in this column are used to code up the 
programme descriptions and then added together and matched against the 6 point scale, with rounding down to 
the nearest point on the scale used (so a score of 0.7 becomes 0.6 for example).  
7 We should expect (pace Barrientos) countries with weakly commodified labour markets to have informal welfare 
regimes that have low levels of benefit coverage. However, nations serious about improving the protective intent 
of their systems should be moving away from this – so we examine coverage for this reason.  Here we use ILO 
data to cross reference 
8 Higher points and easier scoring in this category reflect its increased importance pace Esping-Andersen’s DI.  
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Table 6. Three Dimensions Model 
Ideal Type Label Characteristics Model9 
Productive (P) membership of the education 
investment (EI) set only 
EI ~EP ~IP 
Productive Protective (PP) 
 
membership of the education 
investment (EI), employment 
protection (EP) sets and 
income protection (IP) sets 
EI EP IP 
Productive Plus Employment 
Protection (PEP)  
membership of the education 
investment and employment 
protection sets, non-
membership of the income 
protection set 
EI EP ~IP 
Productive Plus Income 
Protection (PIP)  
membership of the education 
investment and income 
protection sets, non-
membership of the 
employment protection set 
EI ~EP IP 
Not Productive (N) 
 
non-membership of the 
education investment set 
~EI 
 
                                                        
9 In Boolean logic denotes AND while ~ denotes OR (see Ragin, 2000) 
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Table 7. Fuzzy set ideal type country memberships, 2005-2008 
  Productive-
Protective: 
Netherlands; Korea 
 
  
 Productive Plus: 
Denmark, Estonia, 
Norway;  
Poland, Mexico, 
Turkey 
 Protective Plus: 
Austria, Latvia, 
Netherlands 
 
Productive: 
New Zealand, 
United States 
 Weak 
Productive-
Protective: 
Cyprus, Finland, 
Greece, Hong 
Kong, Ireland, 
Lithuania, 
Slovenia; China, 
Romania 
 
 Protective: 
Belgium 
 Weak 
Productive: 
Hungary, Slovak 
Republic, 
Singapore, Canada; 
Malaysia 
 Weak Protective: 
Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, 
Italy, Spain, 
Sweden; Portugal 
 
  Weak: 
Australia, Bulgaria, 
Japan, United 
Kingdom 
  
Notes: Less commodified countries, i.e. countries with >20 per cent of non-wage workers of total employment, in Italics. Strictly 
interpreted, the Netherlands should be in the protective plus set, but under our original cut-off points for our 2009 study it would be 
borderline for the productive protective set so we have indicated that here. 
See Appendix Table A1 and Table A2 for fuzzy- set membership scores for each country and data sources.  
 26 
Table 8. Three dimension fuzzy set ideal type country memberships, 2005-2008. 
 Productive-Protective: 
Latvia, Russian Federation, 
Netherlands; Korea, Venezuela 
 
Purely Productive: 
Canada, Hungary, Israel, New 
Zealand, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, South Africa, United 
States; Dominican Republic, Jamaica, 
Malaysia 
 
 
Productive-Protective 
(Income): 
Denmark, Hong Kong, Ireland; 
Belarus; Kazakhstan 
 
Purely Protective: 
Austria, Belgium;  
Croatia 
 
Productive-Protective (EPL): 
Cyprus, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Slovenia; Chile, China, 
Mexico, Panama, Poland, Romania, 
Turkey 
 
Weak Protective (Income): 
Switzerland; Uruguay 
 
 
 
 Weak Protective (EPL): 
Czech Republic, Finland,  
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, 
Spain, Sweden; Brazil, Portugal, 
Serbia 
 
 Weak: 
Australia, Bulgaria, Japan, United 
Kingdom;  
Argentina, Colombia 
 
 
Notes: Less commodified countries, i.e. countries with >20 per cent of non-wage workers of total employment, in Italics. 
See Appendix Table A1 for fuzzy- set membership scores for each country and data sources. 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1. Fuzzy-set membership by country, 2005-2008. 
 
Income 
Protection 
(2008) 
Employment 
Protection 
(2008) 
Education 
Investment 
(2007) 
Training 
Investment 
(2005) 
Percentage of 
non-wage 
workers of 
total 
employment  
Argentina       0.4 0.4 0 - 20-40 
Australia       0.2 0.2 0.4 0 <20 
Austria         0.6 0.6 0.2 0.6 <20 
Belarus 0.8 0.4 1 - 20-40 
Belgium         0.6 0.6 0.4 0.2 <20 
Brazil          0.4 1 0.4 - 20-40 
Bulgaria        0 0.4 0.4 0 <20 
Canada          0 0.2 0.6 0.2 <20 
Chile           0.2 0.8 1 - 20-40 
China           0.4 0.8 1 0 20-40 
Colombia        0.4 0.4 0.4 - >40 
Croatia         0.8 1 0 - 20-40 
Cyprus 0.4 0.6 1 0 <20 
Czech Republic  0.2 0.6 0.2 0 <20 
Denmark         0.8 0.4 0.8 0.6 <20 
Dominican Republic 0 0.4 1 - >40 
Estonia 0 1 0.6 0.6 <20 
Finland         0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 <20 
France          0.2 1 0.2 0.4 <20 
Germany         0.4 0.6 0 0.4 <20 
Greece          0 0.8 0 0.6 .. 
Hong Kong, China 0.6 0 1 0 .. 
Hungary         0 0.4 0.6 0 <20 
Ireland         0.6 0.2 0.6 0.4 <20 
Israel          0.4 0.4 1 - .. 
Italy           0 0.6 0 0.2 <20 
Jamaica         0 0 1 - >40 
Japan           0.4 0.4 0.2 0 <20 
Kazakhstan      0.6 0.4 1 - 20-40 
Korea           0.6 0.6 1 0.6 20-40 
Latvia          0.6 0.6 1 0.2 (2007) <20 
Lithuania       0 0.6 1 0 <20 
Malaysia        0 0.4 1 0 20-40 
Mexico          0.2 1 1 0.6 20-40 
Netherlands     0.6 0.6 0.4 (0.49) 0.6 <20 
New Zealand 0.4 0.4 1 0.6 20-40 
Norway          0.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 <20 
Panama          0 1 1 - 20-40 
Poland          0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 20-40 
Portugal        0 1 0.4 0.4 20-40 
Romania         0.2 0.8 0.6 0 20-40 
Russian Federation 0.8 0.6 0.8 - <20 
Serbia 0.4 0.6 0 - 20-40 
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Singapore       0 0 1 0 <20 
Slovak Republic 0 0.4 0.6 0 <20 
Slovenia        0.2 0.8 0.8 0 <20 
South Africa 0.4 0.4 1 - <20 
Spain           0 1 0.2 0 <20 
Sweden          0.4 0.6 0.4 0.4 <20 
Switzerland     0.6 0.2 0.4 0.8 <20 
Turkey          0.2 1 1 1 >40 
United Kingdom  0.4 0.2 0.4 0 <20 
United States 0 0 1 0.8 <20 
Uruguay         0.6 0.4 0 - 20-40 
Venezuela       0.6 1 1 - >40 
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Table A2. Data Sources   
Variable Notes Sources 
Education investment  
Total government education 
spending as share of total 
education, health and social 
security spending 
Argentina, Chile, Croatia, 
Dominican Republic, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Panama, 
Sweden, Turkey, Uruguay, 
Venezuela:  
Consolidated central 
government spending 
(includes social security 
funds); China: Budgetary 
central PLUS state spending. 
All data for 2004-2006, except 
Bulgaria (1998), Malaysia 
(1995), Mexico (2000), 
Sweden (1998), Turkey (1998). 
IMF Government Finance 
Stastitics; accessed through 
Economic and Social Data 
Service (ESDS) International 
portal, Accessed through at: 
http://www.esds.ac.uk/ 
 
Training investment 
Labour market training PLUS 
supported employment as 
percentage of total ALMP 
spending 
2005-2007 OECD Social Expenditure 
Database, accessed through 
OECD portal at: 
http://www.oecd.org; 
Eurostat Labour Market 
Policy Database, accessed 
through Eurostat portal at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.
eu/portal/page/portal/eurost
at/home 
 
Income protection: 
Net replacement rates for 
long-term single unemployed 
with no children; earning 
average production worker 
(APW) wage; after tax and 
including unemployment 
benefits, social assistance, 
family and housing benefits in 
the 60th month of benefit 
receipt 
2008, except Netherlands and 
Cyprus (2007) 
OECD Tax Benefit Models, 
accessed at: 
http://www.oecd.org 
 
Employment protection:  
Overall Employment 
Protection Legislation Index 
(EPL Version 1); Rigidity of 
Employment Index 
2008 OECD Employment 
Outlook; accessed through 
OECD portal at: 
http://www.oecd.org 
World Bank, Doing Business 
Project, accessed through 
World Bank statistics portal at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
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Statistical Annex SA1. Income Protection Set Underlying Data  
 Coverage Months of contributions/employment 
required to qualify for unemployment benefits 
Percentage of the salary covered by 
unemployment benefits 
Index scores 
Argentina Private-sector employees, 
temporary and casual workers; 
exclusions: self-employed, 
household workers, public-
sector employees, and teachers 
in private institutions. 
ILO: 8.7% covered by CUB  
6 months of contributions in the 3 years before 
unemployment; 90 days in the 12 months before 
unemployment for temporary workers 
 
50% of insured's best wage in the 6 months before 
unemployment. The benefit is paid for 4 months if 
the insured has 12 to 23 months of contributions; 
for 8 months with 24 to 35 months; for 12 months 
with 36 months or more. 
Coverage: 0 
Qualifying period: 
0.2 
Duration: 0 
Benefit level: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
Brazil: 
 
Persons employed in formal 
private sector, household 
workers, survivors of slave 
labour, and fishermen; 
exclusions: self-employed 
persons. 
ILO: 7% covered by CUB 
Benefit varies according to whether the insured 
had 6 months to 11 months of coverage, 
12 months to 23 months of coverage, or 
24 months or more of coverage in the last 
36 months; paid for 3 to 5 months, depending on 
the insured's duration of coverage; under special 
conditions, the benefit may be extended for an 
additional 2 months. 
Means-tested; monthly benefit according to average 
earnings in the last 3 months of employment: 80% 
of average earnings is paid with average earnings up 
to 767.60 reais; plus 50% of earnings between 
767.61 reais and 1,279.46 reais. 
 
Coverage: 0 
Qualifying period: 
0.2 
Duration: 0 
Benefit level: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
Bulgaria Employed persons. 
ILO: 21% NCUB 
The insured must have at least 9 months of 
coverage. 
 
The benefit is equal to 60% of the insured's average 
earnings in the last 9 months. The duration of 
benefit entitlement varies according to the length of 
the coverage period. The benefit is paid for up to 
4 months with 3 years of coverage; for up to 
12 months with more than 25 years of coverage. 
 
 
Coverage: 0.2 
Qual: 0.1 
Duration: 0.0 
Benefit: 0.4 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
Chile 
 
(A) Employed persons; 
exclusions: persons younger 
than age 18, household 
workers, apprentices, 
pensioners (unless partially 
disabled), self-employed 
persons, civil servants, and 
armed forces personnel. 
(B) Individual severance 
account: mandatory coverage 
for employed persons hired on 
(A) Insured must be involuntarily unemployed 
with at least 12 months or 52 weeks of 
contributions in the previous 2 years 
(B) Insured must be involuntarily unemployed 
with at least 12 months of contributions; insured 
persons with fixed-term contracts must have at 
least 6 months of contributions since they first 
joined the system or since the individual account 
was last fully drawn down. 
 
(A) For the first 90 days, 17,338 pesos a month; 
between 91 days and 180 days, 11,500 pesos a 
month; between 181 days and 360 days, 8,669 pesos 
a month. 
(B) Benefit depends on individual account balance 
plus accrued interest. Decreases each month and 
lasts from 1 to 5 months depending on the length 
of the contribution period. 
 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qualifying period: 
0.1 
Duration: 0 
Benefit levels: 0.1 
 
SCORE 0.2 
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or after October 2, 2002; 
voluntary coverage for 
employed persons hired prior 
to October 2, 2002. 
ILO: 20.1% covered by CUB 
China 
 
All employees of urban 
enterprises and institutions. 
ILO: 12.9% covered by CUB 
Must have at least 1 year in covered employment; 
be involuntarily employed; not be receiving old-
age benefits; be registered at, and regularly 
reporting to, a local employment-service agency; 
and be actively seeking employment. The benefit 
may cease or be suspended for refusing a suitable 
job offer. 
 
Benefit amount set by local governments at a level 
higher than the local public assistance benefit but 
lower than the local minimum wage. Benefit paid 
for up to 1 year with less than 5 years of coverage, 
for up to 1.5 years with 5 or more but less than 
10 years of coverage, or for up to 2 years with 10 or 
more years of coverage. 
 
Coverage: 0 
Qualifying period: 
0.1 
Duration: 0.2 
Benefit levels: 0.1 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
Colombia All private-sector employees, 
including persons working less 
than 20 days with earnings 
lower than the legal monthly 
minimum wage; voluntary 
coverage for public-sector 
employees and self-employed 
persons. 
ILO: .. 
The insured must be unemployed or retired 
 
The benefit is equal to 1 monthly wage for each 
year of employment; a reduced benefit is paid for 
less than a year of employment. (The insured may 
make authorized partial withdrawals from the 
individual account to meet specified contingencies) 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qualifying period: 
0.1 
Duration: 0.1 
Benefit levels: 0.1 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
 
 
Croatia Employed persons with 
insurance coverage based on 
an employment contract, 
including public-sector 
employees, civil servants, 
military and police personnel, 
and judiciary officers: 
exclusions: self-employed 
persons and farmers. 
Unemployment 
assistance: paid to unemployed 
persons who participate in 
vocational training 
ILO: 28.6% covered by CUB 
The insured must be between ages 15 and 65 with 
at least 9 months of employment in the last 
24 months; Unemployed workers with at least 
35 years (men) or 30 years (women) of 
employment are covered until they are 
reemployed. 
 
 
The benefit is equal to the insured's average wage in 
the last 3 months. The benefit is paid for between 
78 and 390 days, depending on the duration of 
previous employment; unemployment 
assistance: 976.60 kunas a month is paid 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qualifying period: 
0.1 
Duration: 0.2 
Benefit levels: 0.4 
 
SCORE: 0.8 
Dominican 
Republic 
None .. .. 0 
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Hong Kong All residents of Hong Kong. 
ILO: 25.2% covered by NCUB 
Persons between ages 15 and 59 with at least 
7 years of residence, including 1 year of 
continuous residence immediately before claiming 
the benefit. There are no requirements for length 
of residence for Hong Kong residents younger 
than age 18. Benefits are income-tested and asset-
tested on an individual basis if living alone; if 
living with other family members, the total income 
and assets of all family members are taken into 
account for determining eligibility. 
 
HK$1,675 a month for a person living alone 
or HK$1,200 to HK$1,490 a month if living with 
other family members, depending on the number of 
family members; plus special grants to meet the 
specific individual needs of recipients. 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qualifying period: 
0.3 
Benefit level: 0.1 
Duration: 0.2 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
Israel 
 
Employed persons residing 
permanently or temporarily in 
Israel aged 20 (under certain 
circumstances, aged 18) to the 
retirement age for the 
earnings-tested old-age 
pension for men (age 66.7, 
rising gradually to age 67). 
ILO: 26.6% covered by CUB 
 
Regular employee: Must have at least 360 days of 
contributions in the last 540 days before 
unemployment. 
Daily employee: Must have at least 300 days of 
contributions in the last 540 days before 
unemployment. 
The maximum duration of payment varies 
according to the category of beneficiary, from 50 
to 175 days. 
 
A daily benefit is paid equal to between 20% and 
80% of the insured's average daily wage in the last 
75 days of work before unemployment. 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qualifying period: 
0.1 
Benefit level: 0.3  
Duration: 0.0 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
Jamaica None .. .. SCORE: 0 
Kazakhstan Employed persons between 
age 16 and the pensionable 
age. 
ILO: 5% covered by CUB 
Must be registered at an employment office and 
able and willing to work 
Also paid to students who register as unemployed 
in the 12 months after graduation.  
The minimum benefit is 100% of the minimum 
wage. The benefit is paid monthly for up to 
6 calendar months. 
Dependent's supplement: 10% of the 
unemployment benefit is paid for each dependent. 
 
Coverage: 0 
Qual: 0.2 
Duration: 0.1 
Benefit: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
Korea All employees younger than 
age 65; exclusions: persons 
working less than 60 hours a 
month or less than 15 hours a 
week, family labour, and self-
employed persons. 
ILO: 37.2% 
 
 
Must have at least 6 months of coverage during 
the last 18 months, be registered at an 
employment security office, and be capable of and 
available for work. 
 
The benefit is equal to half of the insured's average 
daily earnings during the 3 months immediately 
before unemployment. The benefit is paid after a 7-
day waiting period for up to 90 days to those with 
between 6 and 12 months of coverage; for up to 
240 days with more than 10 years of coverage or 
aged 50 or older or disabled 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qual: 0.2 
Duration: 0 
Benefit: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
Latvia Employed persons; active The insured must have at least 1 year of The monthly benefit varies according to the length Coverage: 0.2 
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military personnel and their 
spouses; persons residing in 
Latvia caring for a child 
younger than 18 months; and 
recipients of the child rearing 
allowance, child care benefit, 
sickness benefit, or maternity 
benefit; exclusions: self-
employed persons. 
ILO: 34.8% CUB 
 
contributions, including 12 months in the last 
18 months before unemployment, and be 
registered at the state employment office. 
Special conditions apply to persons caring for a 
child younger than 18 months, persons caring for 
a disabled child younger than age 16, formerly 
disabled persons who have regained the capacity 
to work, and persons in military service. 
 
of the coverage period and the duration of 
unemployment. The benefit is equal to 50% of the 
insured's average earnings in the last 6 months with 
1 to 9 years of coverage, 55% with 10 to 19 years, 
60% with 20 to 29 years, and 65% with 30 years or 
more. 
The benefit is paid for a maximum duration of 
9 months in any 12 month period and the benefit 
decreases over time 
 
Qual: 0 
Duration: 0.1 
Benefit level: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
Malaysia None .. .. 0 
Mexico 
 
ILO: 7.5% in CUB Unemployed persons with at least 5 years of 
service may withdraw an amount equal to 90 days 
of their average earnings in the last 250 weeks of 
contributions or 11% of the individual account 
balance, whichever is lower. 
 
Unemployed persons with 3 to 5 years of service 
and at least 12 bi-monthly contributions to the 
Social Security Institute may withdraw an amount 
equal to 30 days of their covered earnings for 
contribution calculation purposes, up to 10 times 
the legal monthly minimum wage in Mexico City. 
The legal minimum daily wage in Mexico City is 
54.80 pesos. 
Coverage: 0 
Qual: 0.1 
Duration: 0.1 
Benefit: 0.1 
 
SCORE: 0.2 
Panama None .. .. .. 
Poland Employed persons. 
ILO: 18.4 
 
The insured must be older than age 18, registered 
with the employment bureau, able and ready to 
work, and involuntarily unemployed and must not 
have received any redundancy pay or 
compensation. The insured's earnings must have 
been at least equal to the minimum wage during at 
least 365 days in the 18-monthperiod before 
unemployment (periods of military service, 
parental leave, and receipt of allowances are 
credited toward the 365-day period). 
Preretirement benefit: The insured is 
unemployed, eligible to receive the unemployment 
benefit, and aged 63 with at least 25 years of 
coverage (men) or aged 58 with at least 20 years of 
coverage (women); involuntarily unemployed and 
aged 60 with at least 25 years of coverage (men) or 
aged 55 with at least 20 years of coverage 
The benefit is a flat-rate base amount 
(538.30 zlotys) for those with between 5 and 
20 years of employment; 80% of the base amount is 
paid with less than 5 years; 120% of the base 
amount is paid with more than 20 years. The 
benefit is paid for 6 to 18 months, depending on 
the unemployment rate in the region 
Preretirement benefit: The benefit is equal to 
90% of the old-age pension paid at age 65 (men) or 
age 60 (women). 
 
 
Coverage: 0 
Qual: 0.1 
Duration: 0.2 
Benefit: 0.1 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
 
Preretirement 
benefit: 
Qual: 0 
Duration: 0.2 
Benefit: 0.4 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
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(women); or any age and involuntarily unemployed 
with at least 40 contributory or noncontributory 
years of coverage (men) or at least 35 contributory 
or noncontributory years of coverage (women). 
 
Romania Employed persons with 
individual labor contracts; civil 
servants; military personnel; 
certain officials within the 
executive, legislative, and 
judicial authorities; craft 
cooperative members; young 
graduates; and any worker 
(excluding farmers) with 
annual earnings equal to at 
least nine times the national 
average wage (9,693 new lei) 
ILO: 24% CUB 
The insured must have at least 12 months of 
contributions in the last 24 months before 
unemployment and be involuntarily unemployed, 
registered at the local labor office, and actively 
seeking work. 
First-time jobseekers older than age 18 with no 
independent income who have not found 
employment 60 days after the end of their school 
or university studies (30 days after the end of 
military service) are also eligible. 
 
The benefit is equal to 75% of the national monthly 
minimum wage and is paid for 3 months if the 
insured has at least 5 years of contributions; 
9 months with more than 5 years; 12 months with 
more than 10 years. 
A supplement is paid with at least 3 years of 
contributions. The maximum supplement is paid 
for 20 years of more of contributions. 
Graduate first-time jobseekers receive 50% of the 
national monthly minimum wage for up to 
6 months. 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qual: 0 
Duration: 0 
Benefit: 0.1 
 
SCORE: 0.2 
Russia 
 
Citizens between ages 16 
and 59 (men) or 
ages 16 and 54 (women). 
 
ILO: 23.4% 
Must be registered at an employment office, have 
26 weeks of full-time employment in the last 
12 months (or the 26-week equivalent for part-
time employment), and be able and willing to work 
 
Benefits are calculated as a percentage of previous 
average wages and are paid for up to 12 months. 
The benefits decrease over time: 75% of the 
previous average monthly wage is paid for the first 
3 months; 60% for the next 4 months; and 45% for 
the last 5 months. 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qualifying: 0.2 
Duration: 0.2 
Benefit level: 0.4 
 
SCORE: 0.8 
Singapore None .. .. 0 
South Africa 
 
All employees working for 
more than 24 hours a month, 
including household and 
seasonal workers and 
employees in national and 
provincial governments; 
exclusions: self-employed 
persons; government 
employees and employees who 
work fewer than 24 hours a 
month. 
ILO: 10.8% 
 
The insured's entitlement to the benefit increases 
at a rate of 1 day of benefits for every 6 completed 
days of employment, up to 238 days in the 4-
yearperiod before the date of application for the 
benefit. The insured must have at least 13 weeks 
of contributions during the last 52 weeks and be 
capable of and available for work. 
Benefit varies between 38% and 58% of average 
earnings in the last 6 months, depending on the 
insured's period of service, and is paid for up to 
8 weeks.  
Coverage: 0 
Qualifying: 0.2 
Duration: 0 
Benefit levels: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.4 
 35 
Turkey Employees (including foreign 
nationals) aged 18 or older 
working under a service 
contract in the public or 
private sector and certain other 
specified groups. 
Exclusions: Civil servants, 
workers in agriculture and 
forestry, household workers, 
military personnel, students, 
and self-employed persons. 
ILO: 12.7% CUB 
Must have at least 600 days of contributions in the 
3 years before unemployment, including the last 
120 days of employment. 
 
 
The minimum daily benefit is equal to 50% of 
average daily earnings, based on the last 4 months 
of earnings. The benefit is paid for 180 days to an 
insured worker with at least 600 days of 
contributions; for 240 days with at least 900 days of 
contributions; and 300 days with at least 1,080 days 
of contributions. 
The monthly benefit must not be higher than the 
minimum wage for the industry in which the 
insured worked. 
 
Coverage: 0 
Qual: 0.1 
Duration: 0.1 
Benefit: 0.1 
 
SCORE: 0.2 
Uruguay 
 
Private-sector employees in 
industry and commerce, rural 
workers, and household 
workers. 
Exclusions: Self-employed 
persons. 
ILO: 12.5% NCUB 
The insured must have at least 6 months of work 
in the 12-month period before unemployment; 
workers who are paid at irregular intervals must 
have at least 5 months of work and have earned at 
least 8,892 pesos in the 12-month period before 
unemployment began 
 
For full unemployment, workers who are paid 
monthly or at irregular intervals receive a monthly 
benefit of 50% of average earnings in the 6 months 
before unemployment; a monthly benefit of 12 days 
of earnings before unemployment for workers who 
are paid daily. 
Partial unemployment benefit: The monthly benefit 
is 12 days of earnings before partial unemployment, 
minus the value of current monthly earnings. 
Dependent's supplement: 20% of the benefit. 
 
Coverage: 0 
Qual: 0.2 
Duration: 0.1 
Benefit levels: 0.3 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
Venezuela Private- and public-sector 
employees, members of 
cooperatives, household and 
custodial workers, self-
employed persons, and 
apprentices 
 
The insured must have at least 12 months of 
contributions in the 24 months before 
unemployment began and must be available for 
training or suitable employment. 
 
The benefit is 60% of the insured's average monthly 
earnings in the last 12 months and is paid for up to 
5 months. 
 
Coverage: 0.1 
Qual: 0.1 
Duration: 0 
Benefit : 0.4 
 
SCORE: 0.6 
 
